working papers

The Perverse Politics of Polarizationwith Max Mihm and Lucas Siga
Do elections aggregate information when policies benefit some at a cost borne by others?
[Presentation Slides]

Renegotiation-Proof Multilateral Enforcementwith David Miller and David Yang
When is multilateral enforcement vulnerable to renegotiation? 

Image Versus Informationwith Roland Benabou
What are the costs and benefits of using social stigma to promote cooperative behavior? 

Social Learning with Endogenous Information (R & R at JET). 
If information is costly, when is social learning complete?
[Presentation Slides]

Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargainingwith B. Douglas Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan (R & R at ReStud). 
Do more transparent bargaining processes lead to greater inequality?
[Presentation Slides]

Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societieswith David Miller (R & R at TE).
Which networks support the greatest cooperation? 


Ostracism and Forgivenesswith David Miller,  American Economic Review, August 2016.
Do individuals have an incentive to reveal when others deviate?
[Supplementary Appendix] [Presentation Slides]

Recognition for Sale, Journal of Economic Theory, January 2015
What are the implications of selling bargaining power for equity and efficiency?
[Presentation Slides]

Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives, with Charles Lin, AEJ: Microeconomics, May 2013
Suppose that some people are ethical and others wish to appear ethical. Who votes and when?
[Supplementary Appendix]

Herding with Collective Preferences, with Navin Kartik, Economic Theory, November 2012
How do payoff interdependencies influence the strategic rationality of herding?

Learning Self-Control, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2011
Would an individual learn about his temptations?
[Working Paper][Presentation Slides]

Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Jacob Goeree, Navin Kartik, and Tom Palfrey, American Economic Review: P & P, May 2008

Waiting to Settle: Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases,  Journal of Economic Theory, September 2006
Do disagreements about bargaining power delay agreement?